The Development of Financial Markets in Chile by Laborsky, Jeffrey A.
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Chile in transition Perspectives on Business and Economics
1-1-1999
The Development of Financial Markets in Chile
Jeffrey A. Laborsky
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v17
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Perspectives on Business and Economics at Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chile in transition by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Laborsky, Jeffrey A., "The Development of Financial Markets in Chile" (1999). Chile in transition. Paper 11.
http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v17/11
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL 
MARKETS IN CHILE 
Jeffrey A. Laborsky 
Introduction 
Financial markets in developing 
economies are among the most volatile and 
risky in the investment universe. The resilien-
cy of financial markets and the willpower of 
central bankers have recently been tested by the 
global financial crisis. Investors seeking secu-
rity after the market turmoil in Russia and 
Southeast Asia abandoned investments there 
for the safety of United States Treasury securi-
ties or other Western countries' sovereign debt. 
The confusion and panic that took place after 
the start of the Asian financial crisis in October 
1997 eventually spilled over to many other 
world markets. Soon thereafter, investors sold 
the sovereign debt of Latin American countries, 
and equity markets in the region followed suit. 
Financial markets in Chile were among the 
hardest hit. 
The success of the Chilean economy was 
tested by the global financial crisis. Prior to the 
crisis, real gross domestic product (GDP) in 
Chile had grown at a rate of nearly 8 percent, 
inflation continued to decline and unemploy-
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ment remained at historic lows. ("World 
Development. .. ," p. 1) Since the crisis, the sit-
uation for Chile has changed. Real GOP growth 
has begun to slow, and inflation and unem-
ployment are slowly rising. Most observers con-
clude, however, that Chile will not revert to the 
hyper-inflationary environment of the mid-
1970s and will continue to grow. Not surpris-
ingly, the country's financial markets have 
become the topic of many case studies. This is 
due to a rather maverick style of regulation. 
For example, Chile became the first country in 
the world to introduce a private pension com-
ponent to its social security system in 1981. On 
the other hand, Chile has also enacted regula-
tions commonly referred to as capital controls 
that serve to inhibit the inflow of capital into 
the country. This paper aims to shed light on 
what has been commonly referred to as the 
"Chilean Economic Miracle," with specific 
emphasis on the development of financial mar-
kets in Chile. (Martinez and Dfaz, p. 3) 
In what follows, I first review Chile's eco-
nomic history. I then examine the reasons for 
the growth of investment and financial markets 
in Chile. I also consider the scope of financial 
markets today including a review of recent and 
historical market performance. Lastly, I discuss 
the issue of capital control policies in Chile. 
Mter analyzing the current situation in Chile, 
I conclude with some thoughts on Chile's 
prospects for long term stability and continued 
economic growth in light of the serious uncer-
tainty for emerging markets in today's interna-
tional financial environment. 
Chile's Economic History 
Chile's political system and its free mar-
ket orientation have made it among the most 
dynamic markets in Latin America. With a pop-
ulation of over 14 million people, an excellent 
reserve of natural resources and agriculture, a 
burgeoning service sector, and a skilled labor 
pool, Chile has experienced high levels of eco-
nomic growth. Real GOP in Chile rose an aver-
age of nearly 7 percent over the past ten years, 
and the country has experienced high levels of 
savings and investment with low inflation and 
unemployment. ("IADB Database ... ," p. 5) 
These factors have all supported the growth of 
Chilean financial markets and will be discussed 
in the sections that follow. 
Economic Growth and Development 
A period of relative political stability and 
economic prosperity following the demise of 
Pinochet's military dictatorship is evidenced in 
the strong rate of growth in GDP and a subse-
quent reduction in inflation. As depicted in 
Table 1, real GOP has risen at an average annu-
al rate of 8 percent from 1987 to 1997. Most 
impressive is 1995, when real GOP grew at 8.5 
percent while inflation continued to fall. 
("World Development. .. ," p. 1) 
As shown in Table 2, the annual inflation 
rate as measured by the Chilean Consumer Price 
Index ( CPI) has fallen from 31.2 percent in 1980 
to 6.0 percent in 1997. ("World Develop-
ment ... ," p. 2, "Canadian Embassy ... ," p. 1) In 
fact, the Chilean inflation rate has declined 
steadily over the past twenty years. The good 
news for Chileans is that wage growth has been 
accelerating faster than inflation rates, suggest-
ing higher real productivity growth. ("U.S. State 
Department. .. ," p. 3) Higher wages have 
increased the living standards as the percentage 
of Chileans below the poverty line ($4,000 per 
year for a family of four) fell to 28 percent in 1994. 
from 45 percent of the population in 1987. 
("World Development. .. ," p. 2) 
Table 1 
Real GDP Growth Rates 
Indicator 1975-84 1987-97 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998-02 (est.) 
Real GDP Growth 3.7% 8.0% 4.2% 8.5% 7.4% 7.1% 4.5% 
Source: "World Development Indicators CD-ROM," World Bank Publications, February 1997, pp. 1-5. 
Table 2 
Selected Macroeconomic Data 
Indicator 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1996 1997 
Unemployment 10.8% 11.8% 10.4% 19.1% 8.8% 5.3% 4.4% 4.7% 6.5% 6.1% 
Investment 17.4% 13.3% 16.6% 12.0% 18.9% 26.0% 26.8% 27.4% 26.6% 26.9% 
(% ofGDP) 
Inflation Rate 375.9% 63.4% 31.2% 23.1% 17.4% 21.4% 12.7% 8.2% 6.6% 6.0% 
(CPI) 
Sources: Martinez, Javier and Alvaro Dfaz. Chile: The Great Transformation. Harrisonburg, Virginia: R. R. Donnelley & Sons 
Co., 1998. "World Development Indicators CD-ROM," World Bank Publications, February 1997, pp. 1-5. 
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Chile's gross domestic investment as a per-
centage of GOP was over 30 percent in 1995, as 
shown in Table 2. According to the Inter-
American Development Bank, Chile's gross 
domestic investment rate has exceeded 22 per-
cent of GOP for the past ten years. ("IADB 
Database," p. 5) As the Chilean economy felt the 
impact of the global financial crisis, the coun-
try's leaders continued to demonstrate prudent 
fiscal policy. In fact, Chile has maintained a gov-
ernment budget surplus for over ten years. 
("IADB Database ... ," p. 6) Chile also has had a 
very high rate of internal savings. In 1997, this 
rate topped 24 percent of GOP. ("Country 
Commercial Guide ... ," p. 4) Chile had the high-
est Moody's and Standard and Poor's credit rat-
ings in Latin America. ("Country Commercial 
Guide ... ," p. 5) Chilean reserves in May of 1998 
exceeded $17 billion or almost one year of import 
coverage (imports of goods in 1997 totaled $17.6 
billion). ("Country Commercial Guide ... ," p. 7) 
The high investment and savings climate cou-
pled with a prudent fiscal policy is a good buffer 
for Chilean individuals and businesses during 
economic crises. 
Exports and Resources 
Chile enjoys an abundance of natural 
resources, partly due to its vast coastal geogra-
phy. These resources include copper, timber, 
fish, nitrates, precious metals, and molybde-
num. Chile's major exports include copper, fish-
meal, fruits, wood products, and paper products, 
while its major imports include petroleum, 
chemical products, capital goods, vehicles, elec-
tronic equipment, consumer durable goods, and 
machinery. ("U.S. State Department. .. ," 
p. 2) Chile's economy is highly dependent on 
international trade, with exports accounting for 
over 20 percent of GOP since the mid-1970s. 
("World Development ... ," p. 1) In 1995, Chile 
had exports of over $16 billion. (Martinez and 
Dfaz, p. 46) The country's major trading part-
ners include the EU (26 percent of 1996 
exports), Japan (18 percent of 1996 exports), the 
U.S. (14 percent of 1996 exports), Brazil (6 per-
cent of 1996 exports), and South Korea (5 per-
cent of 1996 exports). ("U.S. State 
Department. .. ," p. 2) Major suppliers of goods 
and services to Chile include the United States 
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(25 percent of 1996 imports), the EU (18 per-
cent of 1996 imports), Argentina (9 percent of 
1996 imports), Brazil (8 percent of 1996 
imports), and Japan (7 percent of 1996 imports). 
The Importance of Copper 
Of its export mix, copper is the most 
important for Chile. The country's state-owned 
copper company, CO DELCO, is the world's sin-
gle largest copper producing company. ("U.S. 
State Department. .. ," p. 4) Private sector 
investment in the copper industry has greatly 
increased the production capacity of the indus-
try; and on a combined basis, the private sector 
now produces more copper tonnage than 
CODELCO. Chile's reliance on copper exports 
is striking. In 1986, copper exports were 
approximately 58 percent of total exports. In 
1997, total copper exports were still high at 42 
percent of total exports. ("All Good Things Must 
Slow Down," p. 35) 
The precipitous decline in the price of cop-
per is a clear danger to Chile's export trade. In 
1989, the price of copper peaked at $1.50 per 
pound; but as of 1999 the price has now fallen 
to a low of $0.60 per pound. (Torres, "Chilean 
Firms Suffer Pain of a Japanese Recession," 
p. A14) Consider the fact that a one cent 
decline in the price of copper costs Chile $65 
million a year in export revenue. ("All Good 
Things Must Slow Down," p. 35) These declines 
have resulted in a collapse in Chile 's current 
account balance. Chile does have a "shock-
absorber, " however, in the form of a copper 
price stabilization fund which basically stock-
piles monies collected in periods of high cop-
per prices to offset periods of lower prices. This 
fund stood at $1.85 billion at the beginning of 
1998. (p. 36) Another danger to Chile is the 
economic recession in Japan. Japan is Chile's 
second largest trading partner after the United 
States. In fact, forty-eight percent of Chile 's 
copper exports in 1997 were to Japan. 
Foreign Investment in Chile 
Foreign investment in Chile increased by 
27 percent in 1997. ("Country Commercial 
Guide ... ," p. 4) The flow of capital for invest-
ment from the United States to Chile for 1997 
totaled $913 million. Spain invested the most 
in 1997, sending the equivalent of $1.5 billion, 
and Canada invested $679 million . . Investors 
from the United States have invested the most 
in Chile in the period of 1979 to 1997, with $9.5 
billion of aggregate investments. Canada has 
invested $3.9 billion over the same period, mak-
ing that country the second-largest foreign 
investor. Other important foreign investors in 
Chile include the United Kingdom, South 
Mrica, Australia, Japan, and Holland. ("Country 
Commercial Guide ... ," p. 59) The most com-
mon foreign direct investment occurs in the fol-
lowing industries: agriculture and livestock, 
construction, energy, fishing, forestry, trans-
portation, communications, and mining. 
The Growth of Investment and the 
Development of Financial Markets in 
Chile 
Chile has become a major target for 
investment in the Southern Cone and Latin 
America in general. As domestic and foreign 
investing has increased in the country, finan-
cial markets have grown. The primary reasons 
for growth in domestic and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) are as follows: 1) opportuni-
ties to buy formerly state-run enterprises; 2) a 
burgeoning service sector; and 3) a private pen-
sion fund system with restrictions prohibiting 
foreign investment. 
Privatizations 
As a result of an import substitution and 
industrialization (lSI) program in Chile advanced 
by economists such as Raul Prebish after World 
War II, many enterprises were s~ed or pur-
chased by the state. Under lSI, the state would 
try to build up its manufacturing industry by tak-
ing the following steps. It would target a given 
industry and either create a business from 
scratch or encourage private entrepreneurs with 
promises for market exclusivity if they were to 
invest. The state would then raise tariffs on the 
goods that it produced or that its private part-
ners produced under the special agreements. In 
some cases, foreign investment in such indus-
tries as copper and telecommunications were 
expropriated. (Martinez and Diaz, p. 55) 
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These highly protectionist policies failed 
to meet the objectives of Prebish as an "alter-
native path to the free market." (Martinez and 
Diaz, p. 55) Instead, corruption and inefficien-
cy plagued lSI policies in Chile. Privatization 
of the banking sector, telecommunications, 
electric and gas utilities, and mining concerns 
(with the notable exception of CO DELCO) have 
aimed to bring market efficiency back to these 
areas. Most of the privatization in Chile 
occurred during the military regime between 
1973 and 1990 as University of Chicago trained 
economists called "technocrats" had significant 
influence in the affairs of the economy. 
(Martinez and Diaz, p. 54) From 1975 to 1982, 
CORFO, the state agency in charge of public 
enterprise, auctioned its share of 135 compa-
nies. (Martinez and Diaz, p. 54) Mter the debt 
crisis of 1982, the state intervened in the bank-
ing sector by nationalizing most of the major 
banks, and a reversal of the privatization 
process occurred. However, these banks were 
privatized again in 1985 after the Central Bank 
assumed a majority of their debt. 
Javier Martinez and Alvaro Diaz describe 
the privatization in stages in Chile: The Great 
Transformation. (pp. 53-55) According to the 
authors, between 1985 and 1989 foreign invest-
ment in privatization activity was allowed and 
new forms of privatization emerged, such as the 
conversion of debt from previous years to equi-
ty in debt-for-equity swaps. In addition, they 
note that the direct sale of shares to individu-
als was allowed. It was during this stage that 
many large public utilities were privatized. 
According to former Finance Minister Carlos 
Caceres, the privatization of state-operated 
businesses allowed for a "return to the natural 
order of society." He believes that a privatiza-
tion must serve to strengthen property rights 
and create economic growth. He also contends 
that the economic system needs a capital mar-
ket that provides adequate alternatives for 
financing. As an important component of 
sound global economic policy, Caceres believes 
that privatization must occur in social service 
sectors such as health care and education. 
Studies are already being conducted on the pri-
vatization of Chilean water and sewage treat-
ment facilities. (Caceres, June 2, 1998) 
One privatization involved the Chilean 
national electric power company called EMEL. 
Pennsylvania Power & Light (PPL) of Allentown, 
Pennsylvania, owns a minority stake of 25 per-
cent in the privatized entity. According to Don 
Covaleski, a PPL business manager and utility 
industry expert in Santiago, since PPL brought 
knowledge resources to EMEL, the company has 
increased its efficiency and ultimately its abili-
ty to compete in a deregulated market. Prior to 
the privatization, Covaleski reports that ineffi-
ciencies at the power generating facilities were 
glaring. (Covaleski, May 31, 1998) 
Vladimir Radovic, the Chilean 
Representative to the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, believes that the privatization 
process has produced positive economic results 
in Chile. (June 4, 1998) The privatization 
process has created a "broad ownership 
scheme" in Chile that provides significant eco-
nomic benefits. (Fine, p. 1) Both sophisticated 
and unsophisticated investors alike have taken 
part in Chilean privatization of state-owned 
enterprises. Unsophisticated investors who 
would not otherwise participate in the auction 
of a state-owned company do indeed passively 
participate with their pension program, which 
uses its funds to invest in these ventures. (Fine, 
p. 11) By broadening the ownership scheme of 
shares in formerly state-run companies to 
include foreign investors, officials acted to add 
new equity issues to the domestic equity mar-
kets. In doing this, the government increased 
the capacity of the Chilean equity financial mar-
ket by adding liquidity to the system. (Fine, 
p. 13). Today, Chile's primary equity market 
based at the Santiago Stock Exchange (Bolsa de 
Comercio) and the Bolsa Electronica are among 
the major exchanges in Latin America. 
The Service Sector 
International investment in such areas as 
natural resource procurement and productive 
industrial enterprise has supported the growth 
of the service sector in Chile. A stable and pro-
ductive service sector promotes and facilitates 
international investment and financial markets 
in Chile. According to Vladimir Radovic, 
Chilean leaders are trying to position Santiago 
to be the primary center for financial invest-
ment, accounting, and consulting in South 
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America. (June 2, 1998) Over 58 percent of the 
labor force was gainfully employed in the serv-
ice sector in 1995. ("IADB Database ... ," p. 4) A 
sound service sector allows the foreign investor 
to tap local resources for such concerns as tech-
nology consulting, short term financing solu-
tions, and legal counsel, to name a few. 
Without such a sophisticated and cqmpetitive 
service sector, investors may be discouraged 
from investing. 
Pension Fund Investment 
Another source of the remarkable invest-
ment levels supporting the development of finan-
cial markets in Chile has been the pension fund 
system. Chile's pension fund system is lauded as 
an example for other countries desiring free mar-
ket participation in retirement accounts. As the 
issue comes under serious debate and scrutiny 
in the United States, the success of Chile's sys-
tem has been used to garner support for those 
who believe the U.S. social security system 
should have a private equity component. Chile 
was the first country in the world to privatize its 
pension program. The old pay-as-you-go system 
is being phased out, and a new defined-contri-
bution system has taken its place. 
The new pension fund system in Chile was 
born in 1981 from the work of the financial min-
isters during the Pinochet regime, a majority of 
whom were trained as economists at the 
University of Chicago. The concept of "popular 
capitalism" was very important to these leaders, 
and their privatization efforts aimed to increase 
the people's participation in equity markets. 
(Lieberman) Each employee is required by law 
to save 10 percent or more of his income (auto-
matically deducted from his paycheck) and invest 
these monies in a private management compa-
ny known as an AFP (pension administration 
funds). (Martfnez and Dfaz, p. 63) According to 
Martfnez and Dfaz, "The creation of the AFPs had 
the important effect of permitting the formation, 
practically overnight, of a new business class that 
did not need large amounts of its own capital in 
order to establish itself." (p. 63) These entre-
preneurs that had previously not had adequate 
access to equity financing welcomed the influx 
of capital to the market. 
Remarkably to many observers, workers 
welcomed the private pension system. 
Generous incentives were provided by the gov-
ernment, including a 10 percent wage increase 
for state employees who made the switch. 
Regulations enacted in 1992 have served to 
increase the realm of investment possibilities 
for AFP fund managers, and new disclosure 
rules have helped investors make more 
informed decisions regarding fees, commis-
sions, and investment vehicles used by their 
funds. Investors can switch funds once enrolled 
in the new system, but they are strictly forbid-
den from reentering the public pension system. 
The Chilean military is among a small list of 
groups that have chosen to remain in the pub-
lic system. According to economist Ira 
Lieberman, Senior Manager in the World 
Bank's Private Sector Development Depart-
ment, "Pension funds can provide a great pool 
of medium-to-long-term savings for investment 
in local and international capital markets, and 
local pension funds provide a cushion against 
market volatility." However, he cautions that 
Chilean pension funds may be vulnerable since 
investors are not sophisticated, the level of port-
folio diversification in the funds is low, and a 
sharp reversal in market performance may 
cause significant funding problems. (March 20, 
1998) The Economist has issued a similar 
warning: "The savings of today's pensioners 
were boosted by the high investment returns of 
the system's early years ... But, over the past 
three years, the stock market has mostly gone 
downhill, lowering returns to an average of 1.8 
percent, well below the system's 4 percent 
benchmark." ("The Pensions' Not-Quite 
Miracle," p. 33) 
The goal of the private pension system is 
to provide benefits equal to about 70 percent of 
working income. Problems in the system have 
arisen for low earners, people informally 
employed, and low earning entrepreneurs. 
There are a number of funds available for 
Chileans, but low income earning citizens gen-
erally cannot devote precious resources to these 
programs. At present, Chile's pension fund sys-
tem has over twenty AFPs competing on fees, 
commissions and rates of return. (Fine, p. 2) 
Their assets have grown from $292 million, or 
.82 percent of GOP in 1981, to $27 billion, or 
38 percent of GDP in 1996. Over that period, 
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the cumulative average rate of return was 12.2 
percent for all of the funds. (Lieberman) The 
skeptics cannot refute these remarkable results 
and agree that this system has undoubtedly 
advanced the Chilean financial markets. To 
World Bank Economist Carol Gabyzon, emerg-
ing market private pension funds assist in sav-
ing, redistribution and insurance. (Fine, p. 1) 
AFPs participated in the massive privatization 
program of the 1980s, investing in upwards of 
25 percent of the total equity offered on the 
Santiago Stock Exchange. 
Flaws in the system do exist, but the pri-
vate pension system's effect on Chile's financial 
market has been pronounced. I would suggest 
that one of the most dangerous elements of the 
system is the lack of international diversifica-
tion. When return correlation is low, portfolio 
theory has proven that adding international 
investments to a well diversified domestic port-
folio has both reduced risk and increased 
returns. (Eun and Resnick, p. 275) Even 
though the international investment restric-
tions have been increased to 10 percent of an 
AFP's fund base from 0 percent, total foreign 
investment was only 1 percent or only $138 
million at the end of 1996. (Fine, pp. 17-22) 
Financial Markets Today 
The main stock markets in Chile are the 
Bolsa de Comercio in Santiago ("Santiago Stock 
Exchange") and the Bolsa Electronica (similar 
to the Nasdaq market in the U.S. equity mar-
ket, as all transactions are handled through an 
electronic network). There are several finan-
cial indices that provide measures of the over-
all value and performance of equities. These 
indices include the General Stock Price Index 
(IGPA), the Selective Stock Price Index (IPSA), 
and the Inter-10 Index. The IGPA consists of 
the vast majority of shares listed on the 
Exchange. This is a broad, market-capitaliza-
tion weighted index, similar to that of the S&P 
500 in the U.S. The components of the index 
are reviewed by Santiago Stock Exchange offi-
cials every quarter and revised if companies fail 
to meet the standards set by the Exchange. The 
IPSA Index is composed of the largest 40 shares 
with a major presence on the floor of the 
Exchange denoted by both volume and market 
capitalization. Like the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average in the U.S., the IPSA is a price-weight-
ed index and is reviewed on a quarterly basis. 
The Inter-10 Index is comprised of ten large 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs)l which 
trade in the U.S. equity markets. The ten com-
ponents of the Inter-10 Index are also listed in 
the IPSA. ("Market Summary," pp. 1-6) In 
addition, the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International and Dow Jones Global indices also 
track the performance of the markets in Chile. 
The Santiago Stock Exchange is unique in 
the region in that it offers its members and 
clients a very extensive array of products and 
trading alternatives. The exchange itself was 
founded in 1893 as a private corporation. 
Today, there are fifty-three investment firms 
with operations on the floor of the Santiago 
Stock Exchange. On the Exchange, the follow-
ing financial products are traded: equities; fixed 
income products including short-term coupon 
products and long-term bonds; derivatives such 
as futures and options; monetary items such as 
gold; and investment fund units. Trading takes 
place by open outcry on the floor, through a 
brokerage-linked computer system known as 
Telepregon, and through an electronic auction 
system that collects bids and rewards fixed 
income products to the highest bidder. ("Market 
Summary," pp. 1-6) 
Market Performance 
In 1997, the change in the value of the 
major indices of Chile was mixed. The IGPA fell 
7.78 percent, while the IPSA rose 6.47 percent 
and the Inter-10 rose 15.22 percent. ("Resefia 
Anual1997," p. 23) The combined market cap-
italization of all stocks in the IGPA on March 1, 
1998, totaled $70.6 billion. ("World Bank ... ," 
p. 4) Reflecting the global financial crisis, the 
IGPA's total market capitalization was only 
$46.7 billion by September 1998. ("Emerging 
Stock Markets Review," p. 8) Analyzing the 
IGPA index returns from 1967 to 1997, I found 
1American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are certificates 
of ownership issued by a U.S. bank representing a multiple 
of foreign shares that are deposited in a U.S. bank. ADRs 
can be traded on the organized exchanges in the U.S. or in 
the over-the-counter market. 
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that the average annual return over this period 
for IGPA was 31.06 percent. The standard devi-
ation of returns is often used to compare the 
risk of well-diversified portfolios with a higher 
standard deviation signifying higher risk. The 
IGPA index had a standard deviation of 77.34; 
this is certainly high considering that the U.S. 
benchmark S&P 500 Index's standard deviation 
for this period was about 12 percent. I found 
that the compounded annual return in Chile 
over the years 1967 through 1997 was 10.63 
percent. All else equal, investors would have 
preferred the higher returns and the lower risk 
profile of the S&P 500. (The S&P 500 returned 
11 percent compounded annually over this peri-
od.) This, however, says little about the posi-
tive impacts of diversification to a foreign 
investor who might invest in Chile's market 
because he or she may benefit from a low cor-
relation of returns. 
Capital Controls 
As a result of financial crises, some coun-
tries have chosen to erect barriers to the finan-
cial system to try to slow or stop the fall in the 
value of the local currency should such a fall 
occur. Government actions that are designed to 
control investment inflows and outflows are col-
lectively known as capital control policies. 
Capital control policies tax, limit, or otherwise 
restrict the mobility of foreign money. They have 
been called "financial speed limits." (Torres, 
"Chile's Massad Discusses Capital Control," 
p. A17) Advocates of these types of policies often 
point to Chile because it had investment flow 
policies firmly in place prior to the recent glob-
al financial crisis. The costs and benefits of these 
policies have come under intense scrutiny since 
the crisis. Chile's capital control policies, accord-
ing to some, are preventive measures rather than 
a quick cure. (Btichi) Others believe that capi-
tal control policies in Chile have only served to 
inhibit liquidity, increase the domestic cost of 
capital, and repel foreign investment. 
Many perspectives have emerged from the 
intense debate. My analysis suggests that cap-
ital controls are generally a burdensome and 
short-term solution to financial market down-
turns. Those in charge of a nation's financial 
landscape are better encouraged to assure that 
transparent accounting standards2 are adopted 
and fiscal spending discipline is practiced. Chile 
is a unique case. The circumstances sur-
rounding the first use of capital control policies 
must be fully explored before concluding that 
the specific policies employed in Chile were 
inappropriate. Many of the rules and regula-
tions in place today stem from the Chilean Debt 
Crisis of 1982. 
Origins of Capital Controls and the 
Debt Crisis of 1982 
The International Debt Crisis of the early 
1980s is commonly referred to as the Third 
World Debt Crisis. Less-developed countries 
(LDCs) around the world like Chile owed inter-
national banks over $1.2 trillion in 1983. (Eun 
and Resnick, p. 156) Many scholars trace the 
roots of the crisis to the policies of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). As OPEC raised oil prices throughout 
the 1970s, it generated an enormous capital 
base with which it reinvested in banks and in 
Eurodollar deposits. By 1976, these deposits 
exceeded $100 billion. (Eun and Resnick, 
p. 156) Banks, including large U.S. money cen-
ters like Citicorp, BankAmerica, Chase 
Manhattan, and J.P. Morgan, could not find 
investment vehicles that could ensure the pay-
ment of interest on these deposits. LDCs 
became a viable investment alternative. Each 
of the American banks listed above had issued 
debt of over $1 billion to LDC governments and 
businesses in Latin America. To both parties ' 
detriment, LDCs like Chile used much of this 
financing for unproductive business ventures, 
termed "paper companies," and also used it to 
pay for increased prices of oil imports. 
(Martinez and Diaz, p. 58) 
The International Debt Crisis began when 
Mexico notified foreign banks that it would not 
be able to pay its $68 billion in loans. In Chile, 
the crisis began when industrial conglomerate 
2Transparent accounting standards may be issued by 
regulatory bodies in a given country and are designed to 
give investors adequate information by requiring compa-
nies or sovereign countries to disclose financial and oper-
ating data in an extensive standard format. This allows the 
investor to make a more informed decision based upon the 
intrinsic credit risk of an investment. 
106 
CRAV could not meet its short-term obligations 
in 1981. Shortly thereafter, the Superin-
tendency of Banking announced that Chilean 
banks owed $2.5 billion, an amount which 
exceeded their combined capital base by two 
hundred percent. (Martinez and Diaz, p. 58) In 
1982, twenty percent of the Chilean banks were 
in arrears on foreign debt. The Central Bank 
stepped in to buy this overdue debt using 
national reserves, but a fifty percent fall in the 
exchange rate of the peso versus the dollar made 
their efforts futile. As a result, GOP fell by 14 
percent in 1982. ("OED Precis," p. 2) In 1983 
three banks with debt levels in excess of three 
times their assets were liquidated, and later 
another five with similar debt ratios were taken 
over. By 1985, the state controlled ninety-eight 
percent of all deposits at the Central Bank and 
controlled fourteen of twenty-six banks and 
eight of the seventeen non-bank financial insti-
tutions in Chile. (Martinez and Diaz, p. 58) 
In addition to the Chilean government 
intervention, the World Bank designed a plan to 
help Chile recover and rebuild its banking and 
financial sectors. In 1985 the World Bank began 
making structural adjustment loans (SALs) with 
the goals of "helping the government cope with 
a deepening recession, addressing a persistent 
market failure in medium- and long-term 
financing and providing support for structural 
adjustment in the financial sector. " ("OED 
Precis," p. 2) The Financial Markets Loan (FML) 
provided by the World Bank lent $100 million 
to help the Chilean government develop and 
implement medium-term financing schemes 
and to bolster financial markets. The FML also 
provided funds to the leasing sector. ("OED 
Precis," p. 2) The program was successful. 
According to the World Bank, the success of 
these reforms and operations was due to the 
sound macroeconomic, financial, and industri-
al policy framework and full government com-
mitment to the objectives of the FML program. 
The Aftermath of the Crisis 
The Chilean government responded to the 
Chilean Debt Crisis by reversing its hands-off 
approach of liberalizing the financial sector. 
With the exception of the private pension AFPs, 
the Chilean government was actually more 
involved in the banking and financial sector 
than it had been prior to the 1973 military 
coup. (Martinez and Dfaz, p. 60) Among the 
interventions previously described, Chile erect-
ed capital control policies and in 1982 passed 
Decree Law 600 (DL 600), a minimum stay 
requirement for all foreign investment. This 
meant that international investors could only 
repatriate their principal investment after ten 
years. (Torres, "Chile's Massad Discusses Capital 
Control," p. A17) Under this scheme, however, 
investors could receive earnings distributions 
immediately. This requirement was subse-
quently reduced to three years in 1991 and one 
year in 1993 (where it remains today). In addi-
tion, Chile enacted the encaje, or reserve 
requirement, in 1991 and required that the 
investor make a one-year noninterest-bearing 
deposit with the Central Bank in the amount of 
30 percent of the investment total. This essen-
tially taxed the foreign investor on the capital 
inflow by retaining capital without paying inter-
est. According to former Central Bank 
Chairman Carlos Massad, "The purpose here 
wasn't to regulate the exit of foreign capital but 
the entrance." (p. A17) The encaje was reduced 
to 10 percent in June of 1998. Since then, the 
Foreign Investment Committee has eliminated 
the encaje altogether. When the tax was elim-
inated officials explained, "Our tax on capital 
inflows is like an umbrella: you use it when it 
rains and close it when the rain stops." (Valdes, 
p. A15) This is a dangerous analogy because 
investors cannot be certain if and when these 
taxing policies will be reintroduced. 
Perspectives on Capital Control 
Policies 
Most Chileans whom I met while visiting 
Chile defend the capital control policies of the 
Chilean government. They believe capital con-
trol policies aid in long-run economic develop-
ment and in the development of stable finan-
cial markets. This may be due to the bias of 
Chileans for state involvement or the fear of a 
1982-like crisis reoccurring. (Martinez and 
Dfaz, p. 56) Many of the social leaders that our 
group met believe that the policies have served 
to insulate Chile against deeper financial crises. 
Scholars such as M.I.T.'s Paul Krugman have 
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also come out in favor of a strict adherence to 
capital control policies. As Krugman explains: 
I would summarize the current state 
of the debate as being one in which a 
growing number of reasonable peo-
ple now agree that the demands the 
financial markets place on countries 
in crisis are impossible to meet, but 
still believe that imposing currency 
or capital controls is unthinkable. 
They are therefore looking for some 
palatable middle ground. Unfor-
tunately, that middle ground does 
. not exist. (Krugman, p. 6) 
Krugman believes that capital controls and a 
"dual-exchange rate system" are the best alter-
natives for emerging market countries. He sug-
gests that countries go beyond the Chilean 
model, arguing that "Chilean-type capital 
inflow controls may do little good, even if they 
succeed in limiting the amount of short-term 
foreign-currency-denominated debt.'' 
Finance Vice Minister Cladio Garcia 
believes that Chilean-style measures have kept 
the "hot money of hedge funds and interna-
tional portfolio managers" out of Chile's finan-
cial system. (June 1, 1998) Former head of the 
Central Bank Carlos Massad agrees: 
Capital controls aren't a cure. They 
are a prevention. And they can't be 
used to hide external or domestic dis-
equilibriums ... In general terms, to 
establish restrictions on the exit of 
capital is a delicate issue. You can 
scare foreign investors. It took Chile 
seven or eight years to strongly reduce 
the overall amount of short-term 
debt. These regulations have served 
us well. But if we didn't have the eco-
nomic fundamentals correct, these 
measures wouldn't have hidden our 
deficiencies. (Torres, "Chile's Massad 
Discusses Capital Control," p. A17) 
Massad and other leaders in Chile believe that 
prudent regulations governing the banking and 
financial sectors are essential to preventing the 
1982-style debt crisis from recurring. By 
restricting investors with a minimum stay peri-
od for investments, Chile aims to keep short-
term debt and portfolio investment out of the 
country. Short-term debt has indeed remained 
quite low, averaging only 10.4 percent of GDP 
since 1988. ("IADB Database ... ," p. 8) 
While keeping "hot money" out of the 
country seems to be a noble goal, the policies 
put in place in Chile did not substantially shel-
ter it from the market downturn following the 
recent global financial crisis. (Torres, "Chile's 
Massad Discusses Capital Control," p. A17) 
Instead, these policies have deterred foreign 
investors, altered the market mechanism, and 
hurt small and mid-sized businesses. These 
policies have failed time and again in other 
countries, including the United States, and may 
have been very costly for Chile in the long term. 
Nothing can be more troublesome to an 
international investor than the prospect of los-
ing the value of his or her investment abroad. 
Investor confidence is highest in a country 
where sound and predictable financial market 
regulation is the principal goal of regulators. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case in Chile, 
where the minimum holding period for 
investors is one year. The repeal of the encaje 
in the summer of 1998 should have been a good 
sign for investors that Chile was moving toward 
open and unhindered financial markets. 
However, using the encaje in periods of crisis 
and putting it on the shelf when things get bet-
ter suggests that it will be used again at the dis-
cretion of regulators. This immediately led to 
uncertainty in the investment community. 
Officials at the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) agree that investors are turned 
away by the prospect that emerging market reg-
ulators will enact capital controls: 
The adoption of selective capital con-
trols can be an effective means of lim-
iting short-term speculative pressure 
and may be justified when the attack 
is not warranted by underlying fun-
damentals, but they soon interfere 
with normal trade and finance .. .In 
addition, the expectation that a coun-
try is likely to use capital controls 
during a crisis, thereby restricting the 
ability of investors to adjust their 
portfolio positions, could influence 
the cost and availability of external 
funds during normal periods. 
("Capital Flow Sustainability ... ," p. 8) 
The Economist agrees that, while surges of 
volatile foreign capital have been discouraged 
by essentially taxing inflows in the short run, 
capital controls eventually hurt the prospect for 
long-term investment as well. ("All Good 
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Things Must Slow Down," p. 35) Some Chilean 
leaders agree that capital control policies have 
held back the economy. Former Minister of 
Finance Sr. Carlos Caceras believes that FDI 
restrictions in any form inhibit the economic 
progress of Chile. In his view, all short-term 
investment restrictions should be lifted. 
(Caceras) During my visit, I also learned of 
investment projects considered by Pennsylvania 
Power & Light and Chilean power company 
EMEL that were canceled due to the foreign 
capital inflow restrictions. (Covaleski) In anoth-
er example, one infrastructure project coordi-
nated by the Inter-American Development Bank 
was canceled when a group of foreign investors 
were turned away by the controls. (Radovic) 
The Interest Rate Parity 
Relationship 
The primary arguments of those against 
capital control policies in general are that they 
increase the cost of capital for business financ-
ing purposes and reduce liquidity by severely 
cutting market arbitrage opportunities. 
Consider the interest rate parity (IRP) rela-
tionship argument. (Eun and Resnick, p. 527) 
The IRP condition is an arbitrage equilibrium 
holding that the interest rate differential 
between two countries should be equal to the 
forward exchange premium or discount. 
Violation of the IRP gives rise to profitable arbi-
trage opportunities. (Eun and Resnick, p. 527) 
IRP compares interest rates in a given country 
to that of another by linking them to spot and 
forward currency rates. If IRP is in disequilib-
rium, the domestic cost of capital increases. 
This will have a negative impact on the inter-
national competitiveness of local businesses. 
For example, if local residents are restricted 
from seeking equity or debt capital from 
sources abroad, the market has lost a compet-
itive player. In Chile's case, domestic banks and 
financial institutions are protected from foreign 
competitors. All else being equal, the absence 
of competition results in increased prices and 
thus interest rates (the price of borrowing 
money) are sure to increase. 
In Chile's case, taxing inflows on the for-
eign entity's capital increased the cost of lend-
ing in debt agreements and reduced the present 
value of equity for FDI projects. Higher lend-
ing costs in debt agreements translate into 
higher interest rates for small and medium-
sized local businesses that might not have the 
ability to tap the international debt or equity 
markets. Lower potential returns to equity and 
FDI investors might have dissuaded investors 
from sending capital into Chile. It follows that 
Chile is essentially allowing domestic sources 
of credit to have the competitive advantage as 
foreign lenders, with higher costs due to the 
withholding tax (encaje), will not be able to 
compete with domestic institutions. 
The loss of competition in these markets 
translates into an increase in the cost of capi-
tal for Chilean businesses. Deviations from IRP 
often occur in countries where capital controls 
are firmly in place. According to Eun and 
Resnick, "These control measures imposed by 
governments can effectively impair the arbi-
trage process, and, as a result, deviations from 
IRP may persist." (p. 112) Such was the case 
for Japan in the late 1970s when its government 
decided to stem international inflows by imple-
menting capital control policies. The results of 
a study conducted from 1978 to 1981 compar-
ing Japan's spot currency to the theoretical 
value implied by IRP show that there was 
remarkable IRP disparity in 1978 through 1980, 
a period in which strict capital control policies 
were in place. These deviations converged to 
zero in 1981 when Japan liberalized foreign 
exchange transactions, thus reversing the cap-
ital control policies. In the years of 1978 to 
1980, Japanese businesses experienced a bur-
densome increase in their cost of capital. (Eun 
and Resnick, p. 112) 
Long-Run Costs of Capital Controls 
Some economists suggest that capital con-
trols have made Chile an undesirable center for 
investment without providing any tangible long 
run benefits. Studies conducted by Salvador 
Valdes of Catholic University of Chile show that 
capital control policies have failed to meet their 
goal of affecting the real-exchange-rate behav-
ior. (Edwards, A19) Professor Valdes makes the 
following argument: 
The Chilean tax on short-term for-
eign loans was not imposed as a way 
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to improve the composition of for-
eign borrowing but instead as a mon-
etary policy tool. Moreover, it has 
not protected Chile from financial 
volatility, and as with any tax it has 
created distortions which have cost 
the country in a number of impor-
tant ways. (Valdes, p. A15) 
Professor Valdes goes on to explain that while 
large Chilean corporations were able to tap the 
international bond market, ADRs, and direct 
commercial credit, "small and middle-sized 
exporters and importers could not issue long-
term debt abroad." (p. A15) In a related econo-
metric study published with Professor Marcelo 
Soto at Catholic University of Chile, Valdes 
proved that the encaje failed to delay the real 
appreciation of the Chilean peso after large 
inflows resulted from lightly taxed debt and 
equity raised offshore by large firms. In addi-
tion, the pair showed that the foreign tax on 
inflows failed to reduce the amount of short-
term debt and did not increase Chile's mone-
tary autonomy, as the Central Bank had desired. 
The final argument made by Professor Valdes is 
that Santiago might have lost the opportunity 
to become an international financial center. 
Though it is hard to definitively prove, the 
"migration to New York of stockbroking 
Chilean equities and for the abortion of a 
promising cross-border bank loan business" 
was probably the result of the capital control 
tax and restrictions. (p. A15) 
Speaking on the effectiveness of capital 
controls in Chile, UCLA Professor Sebastian 
Edwards believes that "Chile's remarkable 
resilience is instead the result of a prudent 
macroeconomic policy and a modern and effi-
cient bank-regulatory framework." (p. A19) 
Although the goal of maintaining high interest 
rates through capital controls in Chile has clear-
ly occurred, some economists even question 
whether there has been connection between this 
policy and the decline of inflation. (p. A19) 
Capital control policies have failed in the 
past to provide countries with stable financial 
systems. Even in the United States these poli-
cies were a failure. The Interest Equalization 
Tax (lET) of 1963 taxed U.S. purchases of for-
eign securities in order to stem the outflow of 
dollars. The lET was designed to increase the 
cost of foreign borrowing in the U.S. bond mar-
ket. In 1965 the U.S. Federal Reserve ushered 
in a policy regulating the amount of dollars U.S. 
banks could lend to U.S. multinational compa-
nies engaged in foreign direct investments. 
This policy was known as the Foreign Credit 
Restraint Program (FCRP). (Eun and Resnick 
p. 3.8) Instead of achieving the intended goal: 
legislators quickly learned that the market 
found a way around this legislation. The vehi-
cle was the Eurodollar market. Eurodollars are 
deposits of U.S. dollars in banks located outside 
the United States. International importers or 
exporters who needed dollars to settle payments 
began to take dollar denominated loans from 
banks outside of the U.S. (commonly referred 
to as "Eurobanks"). (Eun and Resnick, p. 146) 
Likewise, importers or exporters with extra dol-
lars deposited these monies in Eurobanks. ~ 
a result of these policies, the U.S. lost a major-
ity of the international money market business. 
Ever since this regulation was repealed in the 
1970s, the Eurodollar and Eurobond market 
has kept a substantial portion of the interna-
tional money market and bond business. The 
lET and FCRP failed to stem the outflow of dol-
lars and actually took business away from U.S. 
financial institutions, proving yet again that 
capital control policies hurt local industry in 
the long run. 
Today, the U.S. State Department agrees 
that capital control policies are detrimental to 
international trade and competitiveness. The 
position of the U.S. was clearly explained to the 
Martindale Center by Jim Roberts, Head of the 
State Department's Chile Desk. According to 
Roberts, Chile must open its economy by liber-
alizing the antiquated capital control policies 
in order to benefit fully from the fruits of the 
global economy. (March 20, 1998) His com-
ments on the subject of capital controls are 
echoed by other U.S. officials, including 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan 
Greenspan, who made the following statement 
about capital controls: 
The resort to capital controls to deal 
with financial market disturbances of 
the sort a number of emerging 
economies have experienced would 
be a step backwards from the trend 
toward financial market liberaliza-
tion, and in the end would not be 
effective. The maintenance of finan-
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cial stability in an environment of 
global capital markets, therefore, 
calls for greater attention by govern-
ments to the soundness of public pol-
icy. (Greenspan, p. 13) 
The capital control polices enacted by the 
Chilean regulators in the Central Bank have 
failed to achieve their goals. These policies have 
p~oven to be costly to Chilean businesses, espe-
cially small and medium-sized enterprises. 
While foreign direct investment in Chile 
remains strong, one must wonder what might 
have been without capital controls. 
Prospects for the Future 
The success of the Chilean economy has 
served to support financial markets. As the 
country continues to improve its export mix, 
expand trade, and attract investment, it has 
maintained fiscal spending prudence. The 
growth of investment and the development of 
financial markets in Chile are also due to the 
large-scale privatization effort, a well-educated 
service sector, and a groundbreaking private 
pension social security system which invests 
over 90 percent of its assets domestically. 
Although financial markets in Chile have been 
very volatile of late, Chilean leaders have craft-
ed a strong banking sector that coped well with 
the global financial crisis; indeed, it performed 
better than most of its Latin American coun-
terparts. Unfortunately, Chilean businesses and 
individuals have borne the brunt of a high cost 
of capital due to the control restrictions cur-
rently in place. The temptation to erect capital 
controls is high during a crisis. 
Most Latin Americans, according to a Wall 
Street Journal poll, perceive foreign investment 
as a factor stimulating economic growth. 
(Schumacher, p. A13) A common belief among 
all participants in the capital control debate is 
that a country must have sound regulation of 
the banking and financial sectors in place. The 
regulation of the financial sector that took place 
in Chile during the 1980s has made it a pillar 
of strength in Latin America. Its reserves of 
over $16.9 billion also place Chile in a good 
position to stave off the effects of future eco-
nomic crises. ("Country Commercial Guide ... ," 
p. 8) However, its reliance on copper exports, 
a fragmented military community, poor physi-
cal infrastructure, and the lack of a venture cap-
ital community to invest in science and tech-
nology are some of the challenges currently fac-
ing the nation. (Radovic, June 2, 1998) Firm 
leadership is needed to set the minds of inter-
national investors at ease. Certainly, capital 
control policies should be discontinued and 
taken out of the tool box of the Central Bank of 
Chile. Only then will Chile be able to unleash 
the full power of the Chilean Economic Miracle. 
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